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Abstract
This paper models two forms of low intensity conflict based on identity: civilizational conflict
between Muslim migrants and the ‘West’ in European countries, and sectarian violence between
religious groups in certain developing countries. Both historical grievances and current material
inequalities can motivate individuals to join or refrain from violence in aid of a group cause. With
civilizational conflict, hatred of the West arises because of economic disadvantage among Mus-
lims, historical grievances and contemporary foreign policy deemed to be against Muslims. Fear
of Muslim minorities among the European population may result from strident propaganda. With-
out tackling inequalities of opportunity, policies of assimilating migrants are doomed to failure.
Sectarian conflict in developing countries like India is driven both by prospect of loot and hatred
of the other. Localized conditions are salient in this regard. Poverty and inequality reduction and
positive local social capital are key to addressing this type of conflict. Historical factors that shape
the myths placing certain minorities adversely within society also need addressing.
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 Since the writing of the first version of this paper, Walter Isard has passed 
away. I came to know Walter Isard personally in the last decade of his life. 
Professionally he was a colossus, the acknowledged father of regional economics 
and peace economics. In addition to his professional brilliance, Walter was a true 
gentleman, and represented a gentler, kinder bygone age, which preceded our 
own excessively competitive era when academic discourse sometimes descends 
into downright bad manners. Walter was never stingy with compliments; he could 
inspire, and any words crafted by me can never do justice to this truly great 
economist, whose passing constitutes an irreparable loss to our profession.    
 
1.Introduction 
 
Identity is salient in defining antagonism in all forms of conflict since time 
immemorial. It refers to the group cause in the context of conflict, and that which 
individual participants in war or conflict identify with and are willing to fight for. 
It is relevant to wars between states, as well as internal war (civil war1), and even 
other forms of violence where the state is not necessarily a target, with or without 
explicit political objectives, (such as sectarian violence between religious groups, 
violent protest and rioting). Identity defines who we are. It specially identifies 
which group(s) we have an affinity with. It can be multi-dimensional, extending 
from family, vocation, tribe, religion to nation. One of these identities can acquire 
relevance in the context of war and violence. As regards inter-state warfare, 
identity usually takes the form of (primitive or modern) nationalism; ‘my country’ 
against another. For God, king and country is an age old refrain driving 
individuals into participation in inter-state conflict. Similarly, tribal, other ethnic 
(race, language) and religious differences define antagonists in civil war; see 
Horowitz (1985) for a discussion on ethnicity as an unalterable attribute that 
individuals associate themselves with. Patriotism, or identification with group 
causes, constitute an important intrinsic motivation for individuals to join a 
collective violent enterprise against another group. But people also have 
mercenary motives; pecuniary gain—looting another country, destroying its trade 
or grabbing its colonies---similar forms of greed can also exist in domestic 
conflict. Most conflicts, arguably, reflect mixed intrinsic and pecuniary 
motivations within their participants.   
Within the realm of formal economics, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) were 
pioneers in developing utility functions where individuals directly obtain utility 
from their own identity based actions, and not merely from consumption. They do 
this by making themselves, as well as others in their group, behave in conformity 
                                                 
1 In a civil war there is usually the political objective of either overthrowing or seceding from the 
state. Military coups also aim at the downfall of the government.  
1
Murshed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectarian Conflict
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
with group norms. This work is in the tradition of the burgeoning field of 
behavioural economics. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) focus on a single, defining, 
identity. But, it also has to be borne in mind that individuals often have multiple 
and layered identities, as emphasised by Sen (2008). Identity, and its study, is 
likely to become increasingly salient within the rational choice methodologies 
studying the economics of conflict as the emphasis moves from pecuniary to 
intrinsic and mixed motivations for individual participation in violence. The 
importance of identity will be heightened as the study of conflict shifts to more 
local or micro-levels, coupled with the growing importance of forms of organised 
violence where the state is not a direct participant or target.     
Identity is crucial to shaping conflict, as it allows for group formation for 
the purposes of violence. It resolves the collective action problem (Olson, 1965) 
in all forms of conflict, even when the motive is mainly mercenary. As far as 
group grievances are concerned, these may centre around historical injustices, but 
present day enduring inequalities and inequalities of opportunity usually also 
matter. Gurr (1970) indicated that the difference between aspirations and reality 
during a period when general material conditions are improving may induce 
disadvantaged individuals to revolt. This, however, is more likely to take the 
shape of organised group conflict when individual and group grievances merge, 
simply because collective action is easier. Also, collective action may be 
motivated not just by injustices against the self or group members in the 
immediate neighbourhood, but perceived historical injustices, and unfairness 
against group members who are geographically dispersed may also figure 
prominently (a Muslim residing in Europe may identify with the plight of the 
Palestinians for example).     
There is a considerable literature on both the causes and consequences of 
civil war in the rational choice tradition. These mainly focus on the material 
(economic, political) basis for conflict, as well as its material effects on society. 
There is relatively less on intrinsic and identity based motivations for conflict---a 
group cause based on identity that individuals identify with and can fight for. One 
reason for this is rational choice approaches often ignore history, concentrating on 
more immediate circumstances. Secondly, there is relatively less literature 
originating from the economics discipline on two forms of low intensity violence: 
civilizational or cultural conflict and sectarian violence. Perhaps, this is because 
neither truly undermines the existence of the state. This paper attempts to fill this 
gap by focussing on both historical factors and present-day material differences 
that motivate individuals to identify with a group cause driving civilizational and 
cultural conflict. I also examine sectarian forms of ethnic violence. Identity is also 
important to the analysis of sectarian conflict. The focus here is on individual 
choices to join or refrain from violence, rather than collective or group choices, as 
these modes of sectarian/ethnic conflict are relatively less pre-meditated.  
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Civilizational conflict refers to a conflict between different ways of life.2 
In present-day Europe, for example, there is a fear of Islam, in the shape of 
Muslim migrants in Europe (25 million Muslims reside in the European Union); 
both in the sense of annoyance with Muslim practices, and the potential dangers 
from home grown terrorism (Madrid train bombings, the London bombings, the 
murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, rioting by Muslim youths in Parisian 
suburbs). Certain segments of the Muslim immigrant population have developed a 
corresponding hatred for the West. Terror and migration (to the West) are said to 
be the two weapons in the militant Muslim’s armoury. This may bring about a 
‘clash of civilizations’ in Europe.   
There can be two explanations for civilizational or cultural conflicts 
between Islam and the West. One is the inevitable clash of civilizations theory, as 
outlined by Huntington (1996)? The hatred for the West by some Muslim groups 
is treated as given, and conflict with the West necessarily follows. The problem 
with these ‘culturalist’ views is that it treats culture as monolithic, and individual 
identity as a singular phenomenon, ignoring the multiplicity of identities that 
individuals may possibly possess (Sen, 2008). Thus, it is conceivable to be 
simultaneously a Muslim, a European citizen, a believer in democracy, as well as 
someone who respects difference and human rights. Contemporary racism in 
Europe is driven more by disdain for cultural identities such as Islam, rather than 
biologically based phenomenon, such as complexion, as was the case until the 
recent past. Racist messages that breed fear of minorities like Muslims can 
emanate from attention seeking politicians, who campaign on a single issue that 
scapegoat a particular group for all of society’s ills (crime, unemployment and so 
on). Continental Europe has seen the rise of anti-immigrant, especially anti-
Muslim immigrant, political parties in Denmark, the Netherlands and elsewhere. 
According to surveys3, negative perceptions about Muslims among non-Muslims 
have grown: in 2008 52% in Spain, 50% in Germany, 38% in France and 23% in 
the UK felt negative about Muslims and Islam. The PEW world surveys indicate 
that dislike of Muslims in Europe is greater among the older and less educated 
segments of the population. The same survey indicates growth in the Muslim 
sense of identity amongst Muslims immigrants in Europe.          
The alternative view holds that radicalization or political Islam in Europe 
does not arise in a socio-economic vacuum, and disgruntled Muslim behaviour in 
Europe may lie in wider material, political and identity based disadvantage. 
Stewart (2009) has documented the systematic disadvantage that Muslim groups 
face in European countries and worldwide (Muslims are nearly a quarter of 
humanity). These range from economic discrimination in terms of jobs and lower 
                                                 
2 There can be an avowed or stated clash between democracy and autocracy, for example during 
the two world wars of the 20th century.   
3 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262  
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incomes to under representation in public life. This phenomenon may be 
described as the horizontal inequalities that Muslims suffer from in contemporary 
Europe. Horizontal inequality is group-based inequality, rather than the inequality 
in an otherwise culturally or ethnically homogenous society; see Stewart (2000) 
on this. Muslim citizens in Europe are systematically poorer, suffer from greater 
unemployment and are less than proportionately represented in public life 
(Stewart, 2009), in addition to the opprobrium their cultural identity attracts. 
Thus, some of the more extreme forms of terrorism and even other non-violent 
acts, which make a statement of difference with the majority community such as 
the wearing of hijabs, may have as their root cause, both the collective sense of 
injury caused by the sufferings of Muslims globally (such as in Palestine, Iraq or 
Afghanistan)4, as well as the more palpable economic, political and social 
discrimination felt within the European states that they reside in. I model this in 
section 2, based on extensions of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) model of identity, 
going on to look at group behaviour. In section 3, I model fear of Muslim 
migrants originating in signals sent out by certain political groups, which may 
result in public action proscribing Muslims and their practices.   
Sectarian violence between religious groups characterise several 
developing countries: Hindu-Muslim violence in India, Christian-Muslim 
violence in Indonesia and Nigeria. These are highly localized (as it is confined to 
certain regions of large countries), and does not undermine the state. The state 
itself is not a target of the violence, unlike in the case of civil war; only localized 
state functionaries are found to be actors in this form of violence. India (see, 
Varshney, 2002) has a longer history than either Nigeria or Indonesia in this 
regard. Brass (2003) points out that Hindu-Muslim sectarian violence (known as 
communal rioting in India) is not as spontaneous as we are led to believe, but is 
very much part of the political process in India, particularly the rise of Hindu 
fundamental parties in Indian politics in the post-Nehru era. Among many 
historical factors, Muslimness is associated with a dark medieval age during 
which little progress took place, and Muslims are also blamed for the creation of 
the breakaway state of Pakistan in 1947. He also feels that, since Muslims, are a 
regular target of these attacks, they should be more appropriately termed as 
pogroms rather than spontaneous rioting.  
Tadjoeddin (2008) points out that Christian-Muslim violence in certain 
regions of Indonesia was prompted by the relative rise in Muslim material 
circumstances compared to the historical Christian ascendant position. This was 
                                                 
4 Galtung (1964) argues that in choosing foreign policy options there may be differences in 
opinion within any given society. There is a central opinion and a peripherial opinion. Muslim 
minorities residing in Europe may hold strong ‘peripherial’opinions about policies towards the 
Palestinian question, Iraq and Afghanistan. More peaceful options, both in terms of domestic 
harmony, and foreign relations, should incorporate the periphery’s opinions.   
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during Indonesia’s democratic transition, and it has mostly fizzled out. The 
important point is that, in the case of sectarian violence localized factors and 
institutions matter, and not national averages or characteristics. Here both 
historical factors and present-day material differences are salient. I sketch a model 
of sectarian conflict in section 4 based upon individual choices to participate or 
eschew this form of violence, before concluding in section 5.      
 
2 . Islamic Radicalization5  
 
We need to distinguish between individual motivation to dissent, followed by 
alienated group dynamics leading to a clash with the state.  
As far as individuals are concerned, following Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), I postulate that individuals directly obtain utility from their identity, and 
the behaviour demanded by that sense of belonging. Thus, an individual member 
(r) of a potential minority group (say, Muslims in Europe) derives utility (Ur) 
from identity related actions in the following manner (other arguments in the 
utility function such as consumption are ignored at this stage for the sake of 
simplicity): 
 
),,(
)(),,(
jrrr
rorjrsr
ssII
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rjkUIssUU

 
      (1) 
 
Here the parameter s refers to principal identity based actions, which yield 
utility (Us) from actions (sr), as well as utility (Uo) from other identity based 
actions, kr. The former is like a club good, and the latter similar to a private good. 
These two enter individual utility in an additive and separable fashion. Unlike in 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000), an individual is allowed to have a complex multiple 
identities (Sen, 2008), and corresponding to these are additive separable inputs 
into his utility function, which is an innovation of my model. The individual not 
only derives utility from a vector of his own actions (sr), but also similar actions 
of other like-minded individuals belonging to his group (sj), and above all his own 
identity or self image (Ir), which in turn depends on the actions (sr, sj) just 
described, as well as the inverse of the group’s social standing, θ. This concept 
resonates with Boulding’s (1956) concept of image. Boulding regards image to be 
the basis of behaviour. Image, including self-image, is always subject to 
messages, akin to signals, which can either be internalised or lead to changes in 
the image, which, on occasion, can be quite dramatic or revolutionary, leading, as 
                                                 
5 The model in this section, and in section 3, is based on Murshed (2009 and 2008).   
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in my examples below, to virulent collective action., In general, one’s self-
perception or image depends both on the group’s economic disadvantage, and 
other factors such as the West’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world. θ may 
also be construed to be a metric of adverse circumstances that produce 
disadvantage and enduring inequalities of opportunity, as in Roemer (1998), 
which disadvantage certain groups because of an adverse perception of their 
identity irrespective of individual qualities and qualifications (see also Stewart, 
2009 on this). More importantly, it is also a barrier to integration with the 
majority. An increase in θ is a reduction of social standing, but it will enhance 
utility from own-identity based actions. It could, however, be argued that low 
social standing may encourage individuals to abandon their primary identity in 
favour of other, less frowned upon, identities. These actions, however, would be 
insincere and based on opportunistic considerations. Also, following Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000), it is possible to show that many such individuals may be deterred 
from this course of action by their peers. 
The budget constraint describing input or actions to individual utility takes 
on the following form (where Sr refers to the total endowment of possible 
actions): 
 
rrr ksS  ),(          (2) 
 
It is postulated that the attractiveness of inputs into own-identity type behaviour 
(sr) rises with μ (restrictions by the state on the behaviour of Muslim minorities) 
and θ; an increase in both can be described as a fall in the relative price of own-
identity based actions relative to other-identity based actions (kr).6  
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000) it is also possible to show that 
individuals derive disutility from the non-conformity of other group members. 
Secondly, if the costs of so-doing are low compared to the pain inflicted on errant 
members, individuals of a group will exert effort to bring back members who 
have strayed from ideal group behaviour back to the fold, as analysed by Akerlof 
and Kranton (2005). Such behaviour can also be said to describe the strategies 
adopted by conflict entrepreneurs amongst Muslim minority groups who are bent 
on confrontation. If another group member (j) suffers disutility (Ij) from other-
identity based behaviour (kr) by person r, they may lure the errant individual back 
to the fold provided that the cost of doing so to themselves (cj) is not too large and 
is less than the loss inflicted (lr) on the deviant group member through a 
cooperative game, requiring the condition:  
 
                                                 
6 Other-identity based efforts include actions conforming to the spirit of the law of the land, and 
behaviour that might be considered by some to be at variance with the individual’s principal 
identity, such as consuming alcohol or dressing ’immodestly’.  
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rjj lIc           (3) 
 
This condition above is more likely to hold amongst poor but culturally 
homogenous communities suffering from widespread unemployment, and who 
live proximately to each other in isolated ghettos with close kinship ties (as in 
many metropolitan locations throughout Europe where Muslim families related to 
each other live cheek by jowl). This is also typical of the horizontal inequalities 
faced by many Muslim groups in Europe. In many ways, this conforms to the 
classic Tiebout (1956) outcome where like-minded individuals endogenously 
congregate in localities that facilitate the common enjoyment of shared public 
goods or club (associational) goods. Moreover, the dissident group may use the 
behaviour denoted in (3) to resolve mutual mistrust, the collective action problem 
as described by Olson (1965). Thus, group grievances become individual 
grievances, and individuals act upon their collective grievances. This, at the 
extreme, can include terrorist acts such as suicide bombing, as outlined in 
Wintrobe (2002), with kr = 0, implying a corner solution (all or nothing choice). 
Note, that it is not just individual poverty that motivates members, but rather the 
group’s relative deprivation; this explains why some extremists are drawn from a 
relatively more affluent and educated background.     
Dissident group behaviour is arrived at after summing the choices 
regarding sr from individual utility maximization described in (1), subject to 
individual constraints (2): 
 
es
n
r
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1
                                      (4) 
 
For collective action (like a club good) to take place via the adoption of the group 
strategy (e), a critical threshold of aggregate own-identity based actions, ∑sr, must 
be chosen. Not all individuals will engage in own-identity based actions. The 
forging of collective action requires high enough values of μ and θ; condition (3) 
must also hold so that it is not too costly to deter non-own-identity based actions 
through cooperative games; at high enough values of μ and θ condition (3) 
becomes more relaxed, as more self-enforcing and sincere own-identity based 
behaviour takes place via (2).  
The dissident group, objective or utility function, R, takes the following 
form: 
 
)())(1(),( eERReaR CP                           (5) 
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The superscripts P and C refer to states which are more peaceful and 
confrontative, with probabilities π and 1- π respectively. The probability of peace 
rises with an action (e) by the dissident group, and (a) on the part of the state to be 
outlined below. Both strategies are, however, a hybrid of accommodation and 
aggression. RP and RC describe dissident group pay-offs in the two states, with 
utility greater in the peaceful states. Utility is derived from income (YR), and a 
transfer (T) obtained from the state, which is related to the manner in which the 
state spends its security budget (A).  The state’s decision making is described in 
the section that follows. Strategic choices surround e (effort with regard to peace 
with the state) obtained from (6); it is a ratio of transfers (which generate 
peacefulness) to fighting, FR, which is greater when the group’s social standing 
(horizontal inequality) declines (θ rises). The parameter µ describes greater 
restrictions by the state on the behaviour of Muslim minorities, and is therefore 
liable to raise militancy. E describes the aggregate cost function for undertaking e, 
composed of psychic costs of ‘capitulation’ to the state or the total costs of 
inducing own-identity based behaviour in (3), with Ee > 0. Note that as e rises 
there is more peace with the state; a decline in e defines greater militancy.  
Collective group behaviour, via the group strategy, e, is akin to a club or 
associational good (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). A club good is excludable in 
nature, only those who subscribe or contribute can partake in it. It is ‘voluntary’ 
because individuals do not have to participate, unlike in the case of non-
excludable pure public goods. With club goods, membership and provision are 
inseparable. This club will not suffer from congestion externalities; members may 
not be homogenous in their ability to contribute, which are not necessarily 
anonymous.  Differentiating the dissident group’s strategic variable (e) in (6) we 
find: 
 
 
d
F
Td
F
TdA
F
Tde RRR
A
22
)()(
),(
               (7) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of (7) is positive, e rises with T, but 
falls with θ and μ. Equal opportunity policies raise peaceful behaviour; economic 
disadvantage, diminution of social standing and state proscription enhance 
radicalization. 
where: 
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The disgruntled group will maximise (5) with respect to e, equating its 
marginal benefit to marginal cost: 
   eCPe ERR  (.)(.)                   (8) 
 
 3. The Crescent and the Cross 
 
The utility of the state or the majority group is given by: 
 
)())(1(),( aCGGeaG CP         (9) 
where:  
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GP and GC refer to exogenous pay-offs to the government in the two states. For 
the government (and the society it represents), utility is derived from two public 
goods: general consumption (YG) and security expenditure (A) against domestic 
terrorist threats, with the former larger in the peaceful state. Also, GP >GC; society 
at large derives greater satisfaction in the peaceful state when spending on public 
goods such as education and health is greater. Security expenditure can be used in 
two ways: a component (FG) devoted to suppressing dissidents (via policing, 
surveillance and the prohibition of certain cultural practices in order to induce 
integration), and another element T, which is a transfer to the dissident group, 
which serves to assuage their grievances. The transfer can mean several things: 
greater inclusion in public sector jobs, political representation and voice; basically 
equal opportunity policies. It is the pecuniary value of including the excluded. 
Observe that there is a trade-off based on two policy alternatives towards the 
dissidents: suppression (stick) and transfers (carrot).  
The probability of peace, π, increases with the parameters, a and e, which 
correspond to mixed strategies of accommodation and aggression pursued by the 
two sides to the game, the government and dissidents, respectively. For the 
government side, for example, a is defined in (10) as the ratio of transfers (T) and 
fighting (FG), with the numerator raising the chances of peace and the 
denominator reducing it. An increase in the ratio, a, therefore implies a rise in 
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relative peaceful behaviour. I postulate a rise in heavy-handed behaviour towards 
dissidence (FG), has only a limited deterrent effect; it actually increases militancy 
and the sense of grievance. C refers to the cost of undertaking a by the state, Ca > 
0. These costs consist of pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements; the first because 
of the cost of distortionary taxation to finance security; the latter because 
accommodating dissidents entails a political cost by alienating those opposed to 
the policies adopted. Violent acts occur only in the confrontative state, and the 
Nash equilibrium to the game between the two sides occurs along a continuum of 
peaceful actions by both sides. Equilibria with low levels of peace chosen by both 
sides are confrontative, enhancing the risk of rioting and terrorism by the 
dissidents.    
The parameter μ is crucial to the determination of the aggressive 
component of the policy vector adopted by the government side towards 
potentially ‘radical’ Muslims. A higher μ implies a more confrontative public 
policy. Following Glaeser (2005) we can think of μ as originating in a signal sent 
out by a politician, whose word (credibility) is not exactly the ‘coin of the realm’, 
because he may be deliberately sending out a false hate message as a cheap way 
of advancing his own popularity. Its attractiveness to the public will depend on 
their need for scapegoats and their own personal life experiences of these minority 
groups. Not all these signals will be believed: for example, some hate mongering 
politicians may be mistrusted, the better educated among the public may discount 
part of the message and others with greater knowledge of the minorities based 
upon personal interaction may similarly disregard this signal. There is a cost (z) to 
members of the public of verifying the veracity of the signal through a search 
process. Let φ be the probability that the politician is sending out a false message 
and the Muslim group in question is largely innocent; 1 – φ is the probability that 
they are not, and will therefore impose a net cost μ. Individual’s will update their 
Bayesian prior for this in the following manner: 
 


)1(          (11) 
 
The prior may be updated subject to the aforementioned search cost z, and other 
exogenous events like riots and acts of terrorism (close to home) perpetrated by 
Muslims. The public is composed of two types: a high cost type (indexed by 
subscript h) who both suffer more potential damage (μ) and also have higher 
search costs (z); and, a low cost type (subscript l) who suffer less disutility from a 
potential Muslim threat and have lower search costs of finding out the truth 
(because of education, say). The former may include the less educated, the more 
socio-economically disadvantaged, those who would like to find close to home 
scapegoats for the risk of unemployment that the globalization of production 
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brings, others who wish to find a simple explanation for the rise of crime, as well 
as those with a negative experience of interaction with Muslims. In general: 
 
typestlowforzand
typesthighforz
lhiizzyV
llz
hhz
iii
cos)1(
cos)1(
,)()1)((
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Where V represents expected utility and y income of individuals of i = h,l types, 
diminished by μ and z costs. Maximization of this expected utility with respect to 
search (z) leads to the conditions described in the second and third lines of (12) 
respectively. The high cost type of individual suffers both a greater perceived loss 
from Muslim dissidents (μh) and has a higher cost of verification of the signal (zh). 
This is all the more so, if the search costs of verifying the signal entail an earlier 
lumpy fixed cost in education, say. These individuals are more likely to abandon 
the search for truth in favour of the hate message, setting φ = 0. Not only that, but 
they will clamour for public action against the object of their phobia. Even the 
low cost type individual (who will engage in the search for truth) may at certain 
times randomise the probability of φ around 0 or 1, if say equilibrium φ ≈ 1/2 in 
(12). Also, after major riots involving (male) Muslim youths and terrorist attacks 
like the London bombings, all individuals from the majority community may set φ 
to zero for a certain time, effectively tarring all Muslims with the same (terrorist) 
brush. 
If enough voters believe the signal then public action will be called for, 
and Islamophobia or fear of Muslims acquires the nature of a public good. Note 
that  
i
i  in equations (9) and (10); this includes individuals whose actual 
valuation of μ is non-positive because of the non-rivalled and non-excludable 
nature of a public good, even those who do not derive utility from it are ‘forced’ 
to ‘consume’ the good and finance it via taxation.  The state will be compelled to 
act at the taxpayers expense (C), but some reservations may exist about 
surrendering to Islamophobia.  It is instructive, therefore, to examine the 
government’s strategic variable, which is a mix of accommodation (T) and 
confrontation (FG). Totally differentiating, a, in (10): 
 


d
F
TdA
F
T
F
Tda G
A
GG
A
22
)()( 

         (13) 
 
All the partial derivatives in (5) are positive. The security budget (A) can be 
utilised either to increase transfers to the dissidents or fight them. Therein lies a 
trade-off; thus the term in square brackets in (5) is ambiguous in sign. The second 
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term on the right-hand side of (5) is negative, because a rise in the confrontation 
public policy vector (μ) causes the state to be less ‘peaceful’. For a certain type of 
government, the first term is positive; it prefers peace. I utilise this taxonomy, 
because there may be different expenditure effects following an increase in the 
security budget depending on the type of government in different countries.7  
The government side maximizes (9) with respect to a: 
 
a
CP
a CGG  (.)](.)[       (14) 
 
Essentially, this means that the government equates the marginal utility of its 
strategic action (a) on the left-hand side of (14) to its marginal cost on the right-
hand side. One can utilize equations (8) and (14) to obtain reaction functions for 
the dissidents and the government respectively. It can then be shown that 
increases in militancy can be a result of a rise in horizontal inequalities (θ) 
amongst Muslims, foreign policy actions that adversely affect Muslims (also a 
rise in θ), or a reaction to greater state restrictions on Muslim behaviour, μ (such 
as the wearing of hijabs). All of this result in less peaceful behaviour by both the 
European state and its Muslim malcontents towards each other. For militancy to 
become violent, a critical low threshold of emin must be arrived at.   
 
4. Hating One’s Neighbour: Sectarian Violence 
 
Now we turn to purely sectarian violence, also based on identity, in countries like 
India, Indonesia or Nigeria.8 Here the antagonists are two different ethnicities, 
without the direct participation of national government, although occasionally 
local authorities take sides in these clashes. The violence that occurs is 
spontaneous and sporadic, and is usually described as rioting. These violent 
episodes do not necessarily undermine the existence of the central state, unlike in 
the case of civil war. But, nevertheless it is a cause for concern; Varshney (2002) 
estimates that it has killed or maimed 40,000 individuals since India’s 
independence in 1947.  
The model that follows is based on Mahmud and Murshed (2010). Let us 
say that society is characterised by the presence of two groups, Hindus (H) and 
                                                 
7 Good examples could be given by contrasting the present Spanish and Danish governments. The 
latter’s (or some of its coalition partners) negative attitudes and explicit policies towards Muslims 
is well known; see http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/denmark/#identifier_73_465 . By 
contrast the Spanish government led by Prime Minister Zapatero is far more conciliatory towards 
Muslims, including illegal Muslim migrants, and Zapatero called for an international alliance of 
civilizations; see http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/328/251/lang,english/ 
8 India has the longest history of this type of sectarian conflict; in certain parts of the country it is 
almost an annual event; see Brass (2003).   
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Muslims (M), with i = H, M. Here the probability of peace, π, is declining in the 
number of radicalized individuals from each group, RH and RM. Not every 
member of either community will join the radicalized segments of their group (RH 
and RM respectively). Thus, there will be two types of individuals: joiners and 
non-joiners. That will depend on their peacetime income (YP) relative to income 
in conflict (YC), and the valuation of looting (l) in a state of violence, as well as 
the costs of participation, τ. For some extremist individuals these costs may even 
be negative, reflecting historical hatreds and injustice. Looting is more successful 
the greater is the number of radicalized individuals.   
If an individual from any group becomes a joiner (J) into the radicalized 
segment of his group, his expected utility (U) takes the form: 
 
iMH
Ci
MH
Pi
MHiJ RRlYRRYRRU   )),()(,)(1()( ,   (15) 
 
Even if income in the state of conflict is low (YC), one expects that this 
individual’s income in the peaceful state, YP is more than counterbalanced by 
lootable income (l) in the state of conflict. His participation costs (τ) may even be 
negative. This person is both consumed with hate, and is likely to be poor. 
For the person from either group who does not join, (N), their expected 
utility is: 
 
Ci
MH
Pi
MHiN YRRYRRU )),(1())(( ,      (16) 
 
In other words, for this type of individual, the probability of peacetime income is 
higher by a factor λ, and similarly lower in the state of conflict; this type of 
individual has a lot to lose from participating in violence. This person must be, 
relatively speaking, more affluent. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for participating in sectarian 
rioting are: 
 
0),R(),R )(1()( HH 

iMM
PiCi
iNiJ
RlRYY
UU

   (17) 
 
A number of points can now be made. First, the quasi-reaction9 functions of 
individuals may not always be positive, meaning that a tit-for-tat strategy is not 
always followed. It is perfectly possible for weaker groups to react to more 
                                                 
9 A quasi-reaction function represents reactions by an individual to the group behaviour of the 
rival community.   
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violence by the other group by defensively refraining from violence. For example, 
Mitra and Ray (2010) point out that in India, the Hindu community as a whole 
tends to predate on the Muslim community, whenever the relative expenditure of 
Muslims over Hindus rises. If that is true, then there is an aggressor and a target, 
with the target group acting defensively. In that case, their quasi-reaction function 
will be negatively sloped.  
Secondly, it is possible for non-joiners to fund violence by poorer 
members of their community towards the other group. In this case, τ(YNP). In this 
connection an increase in between group polarization will encourage more 
sectarian violence. Even an increase in within group polarization (greater 
inequality inside each group) may encourage more violence, if there are more rich 
funders and more radicalized poor individuals ready and willing to participate in 
violence.  
Thirdly, an increase in lootable income, relative to peaceful income, 
encourages more violence---this is likely to arise during political transitions or 
regime changes in countries like Indonesia or Nigeria, or because of a general 
laxity towards law enforcement by local authorities, as is the case sometimes in 
certain Indian cities.  
Finally, an increase in peacetime income is likely to reduce violence, and 
the numbers of those who join such conflictual enterprises. This even more likely 
if there are economic complementarities between the two groups, as identified by 
Jha (2008). In the Indian state of Gujrat there is no ‘communal’ (Hindu-Muslim) 
rioting in Surat, unlike in another city, Ahmedabad, where such rioting is 
endemic. This is because traditionally Hindus and Muslims depend on each other 
for their livelihoods (there are occupational complementarities) in Surat, unlike in 
some other parts where their livelihoods involve competition for resources, and 
they therefore are more likely to attack each other. Analytically, this would mean 
peaceful income YP for one group depends on the other group’s peaceful income 
also. In cities like Surat, Hindus and Muslims may have built up positive social 
capital vis-à-vis each other; this encourages cooperative behaviour.  They are also 
perhaps better acquainted with each other. This also helps the accumulation of 
‘bridging’ social capital (Basu, 2005).  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have highlighted the salience of identity in explaining conflict, 
which may be of increasing importance in future directions of conflict research, 
particularly at a micro-level and in the forms of conflict that are not strictly civil 
war. I focussed on individual decision making, where identification with the 
group is salient in driving violent collective action against another group in the 
context of low-intensity cultural and sectarian conflict. Historical factors and 
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present-day socioeconomic factors matter. An ideal society, one that is tolerant of 
difference as described by Rawls (1999), is perhaps what we are aiming for in 
terms of policy.  
As far as civilizational conflict is concerned, excessive deterrence against 
potential dissidents may backfire. These include heavy handed policing and the 
proscription of Muslim practices. It may produce more militancy and swell the 
ranks of the disaffected, and increases the danger of both vandalism and terrorist 
violence.  Secondly, space needs to be created so that most Muslim migrants are 
able to merge their personal identities within their adopted European homelands. 
This includes developing a personal imperative to be tolerant of difference. This 
will serve to increase the costs of admonishing other group members for adopting 
behaviour in conformity with the ‘other-identities’ that make up their complex 
personal identity. Policies that make it difficult to be both European and Muslim 
are bound to be self-defeating. Many of the perpetrators of the London bombings 
were well integrated second generation immigrants before becoming radicalized. 
Thirdly, economic discrimination, the horizontal inequalities faced by Muslims in 
Europe, needs addressing. Otherwise policies of integration or assimilation are 
bound to fail. This requires a strengthening of equal opportunity policies and laws 
to deal with the systematic disadvantage, particularly in labour markets, faced by 
Muslims in Western Europe, as pointed out by Stewart (2009). Radicalization 
amongst Muslim minorities may be less significant in societies where they face 
less identity based inequality of opportunity, as in the USA or Canada. Economic 
progress will reduce the power of the ghetto by permitting exit from the ghetto; 
allowing individual Muslims to act more on the basis of their ‘other’ identities, 
and raise the costs of luring them back into ‘distasteful’ and dubious own identity 
based violence like rioting or terrorism.  
One common feature running through both civilizational and sectarian 
conflict is the presence of an alien ‘another’ in the midst of a so-called different 
majority. Curiously, Muslims figure in both my examples: as they are the 
undesirable aliens in the context of Europe, as well as India. 
The easing of sectarian conflict in developing countries requires poverty 
reduction and the stemming of the inequalities produced by economic 
globalization. Declining poverty raises the attractiveness of peaceful income, 
rather than the earnings related to loot and violence. The inequality produced by 
globalization produces richer sectarian individuals who fund sectarian causes, 
leaving it to their poorer brethren to enact the violence. Hence social safety nets 
and the public provision of health and education that combat poverty and lower 
inequality are important. Localized institutional functioning also needs 
addressing. This includes the often virulently sectarian outlook of local 
governments, such as the government of the Indian state of Gujrat. Furthermore, 
getting to know the “other” via more bridging social capital between communities 
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is also important in building peace, as are the advantages of peaceful income to 
individuals.  
The historical dimensions of sectarian (communal) conflict cannot be 
overemphasized, although beyond the scope of this work. They have their roots in 
the nationalist movements in British India, and the struggle for independence, and 
may even go further back in history. Brass (2003) points to the historiography 
(encouraged from British times) that is pervasive in modern India. In that 
discourse, there is first an older/ancient Hindu period roughly up to the 12th 
century (where the salience of the Buddhist reformation and the Hindu counter-
reformation is often conveniently forgotten), followed by a period of Muslim 
conquest and dominance which is usually viewed as a dark age for the Hindu 
majority, leading finally to British rule from the 18th century, culminating in the 
nationalist struggle and independence in 1947. 
In contemporary India, the Muslim collective identity is sometimes 
associated with the medieval period in Indian history, an era of decline, and as 
something alien to true Indianness. Muslims are also blamed for the creation of 
the breakaway state of Pakistan. Most Muslims in South Asia are, however, not 
descended from foreign migrants, but are indigenous South Asian converts to 
Islam. Brass (2003) points out that Muslim enclaves in India are often regarded in 
the communal discourse as representing mini-Pakistans. In short, the 'Indianness' 
of Muslims in post-independence India is suspect, and they may be regarded as  
'outsiders'. Their potential disloyalty has fed communal violence in its hatred 
dimension, in addition to the economic factors we have outlined. Equally, it is 
also important to understand the complexities of the Muslim identity; there is a 
sense of belonging of Muslims to an Islamic world that can transcend South Asia, 
although this does not preclude good citizenship within any of the South Asian 
states that followed British departure in 1947. Muslims in India have a sense of 
loss of their identity and cultural positioning, exemplified much long ago (in 
1888) in the verse of the Urdu poet, Altaf Hussein Hali, and spawned out of his 
palpable fear for the future marginalization of South Asian Muslim culture.10 
In the post-Nehruvian period, and since the 1980s in particular, militant 
Hindu parties such as the BJP (Bharitiya Janata Party), related to older militant 
parties such as the RSS (Rashtriya Shyamsevak Sangh) have gained a foothold in 
                                                 
10 Farewell O Hindustan------ 
We your homeless guests have stayed too long 
We were convinced that adversity would befall us in time 
And we O Hind would be devoured by You 
by Altaf Hussein Hali (1888)---Shikwa-e-Hind (Complaint to India) quoted from Jalal (1999). 
Note Hind is the Arabic word for India. 
16
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 9
http://www.bepress.com/peps/vol16/iss2/9
DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1211
mainstream Indian politics at both the state and national levels.11 These parties are 
wedded to concepts of Hindutva (Hinduness), where Muslimness may be seen as 
an outside culture and influence. Incidents such as the destruction of the Babari 
Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, and the riots in Gujarat in 2002 (where even the 
state Premier was implicated as being complicit with the violence against 
Muslims) are examples of the most egregious events in recent communal strife in 
India. Ultimately, the flawed nature of Indian democracy and its political process, 
which institutionalizes communal politics, needs addressing. As Brass (2003) has 
pointed out, Hindu-Muslim conflict is not just a spontaneous event, as is 
commonly described, but is very much part of the politics of post-Nehru India. 
Brass (2003) also argues that the ascription of communal violence, however, to 
spontaneous combustion is very much part of a blame shifting exercise to explain 
away its deeper causation. Ultimately, communal harmony requires acceptance by 
all of a permanent South Asian place for Islam, and as something which is not 
evanescent but part and parcel of its domestic landscape. 
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